DECLINING AMERICAN POWER
James Russell Wiggins

A period of world history marked by rising American
power has passed.

We enter an era of diminishing American power.

We have gone over a continental divide, an historical
watershed, and have, as yet, only dimly perceived the alteration
of the landscape through which we move, noting but tardily that
a descent has commenced, long after the turning point of our
journey.

Slowly, the unmistakable signs of lessening altitude

will make themselves felt upon our consciousness in a thousand
discernible ways.
It is a new experience for Americans.
have been travelling upward.

Hitherto, they

Nothing in the American past

conditions the people for the altered environment, a new direction,
a decline of power.
It is futile to debate whether the change is good, bad,
or indifferent.

It is idle to try to go back on the path we have

taken and locate the point of departure from the upward climb.
The beginnings of rising American power are far back
in our history.

It could be dated from the War of 1812 when the

Independence of the country from Great Bri t a n was really finally
sealed in conflict.
North American state.

Decade after decade, power gathered about the
Suddenly the nation assumed its continental

proportions and took its place among the great powers of the world.
World War I finally heralded its full arrival upon the international
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stage.

World War II found the country not only present on the

world stage, but dominating it.

The postwar years confirmed that

predominance.
Then the country began to tire of a great power role.
Whether the disillusionment was wholly the result by Indo China,
or flowed, as well from a multiplicity of other causes, will be
debated by historians of the future.

In any case, citizens conditioned

by generations of rising American power began to grow disenchanted
with the responsibilities of power.
Quite swiftly, Americans began to be acutely aware of the
anguish of great power.

Quite deliberately, American legislators

have begun to dismantle the nation’s power and influence abroad.
They have responded to a rising American distaste for the exercise
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of power.

All the great train of consequences that flow from the

possession and use of power began to dismay Americans.

They were

increasingly disenchanted with the hardships and inconveniences
inevitable to the role; and increasingly impatient with the
embarrassments often incidental to it.
Steps to diminish American power followed this disillusion
ment.

They had their origin as well in the lingering historic

contempt for imperial power going back to the nation’s birth struggles
against imperial power’s Eighteenth Century embodiment in Great
Britain.

A substantial percentage of American citizens retained

an inherited antipathy to great power even when their own country
became a great power.

The desperate years from 1775 to 1783 left

a deep genetic imprint upon the American mind.

A vestigial remnant

of the ancient hatred of great national power survived the country’s
growth to continental dimensions, its industrial expansion to world
leadership, its overwhelming military thrust.

Millions, at the

peak of American power, retained an infatuation with remembered
virtues, purity, and merit of a tiny country of three millions of
people, guiltless of any designs upon the power or territory of
i

others, innocent of any ambition in world affairs, and dedicated
to the enjoyment of insular and isolated happiness behind the ocean
moats that for so long shielded the land against attacks from abroad.
The reality of American power for years made itself felt
t

in every quarter of the globe.

Decisions everywhere in the world

were for decades;.importantly influenced by estimates of what the
United States could do and what it would do.

No one will ever

know how many aggressive designs were abandoned because of an
a pprehension that they might arouse the application of American.
power.

No one will ever know how many policies were undertaken

in the expectation that American support would be forthcoming.
American power became, and for decades remained, the single most
important factor in the decisions of many nations, great and small.
American intervention in two world wars and an infinite
number of lesser military affairs publicly demonstrated, this
influence; but the existence of power exerted its weight in thousands
of instances unknown to the public,’ and- in many not known even to
those in charge of American affairs.
It was not just a possession of military might alone
that was embraced in the great power influence of the United States,
of course, but the combination of the hardware of military force
coupled with willingness to use that physical force.

The hardware

that remains in this country still is formidable— as formidable as
that of any other great power.

The ability of the government to

Tr^r

‘v ^ n w g l f l 1! •’■vsg'iwgv

-•■ iT -K W ’ r

-4i

use it has been visibly altered.

The anxiety of Congress to

curb executive discretion has resulted in specific legislative
restraints neon executive prerogative.

These restraints 2 1 0 doubt

reflect a popular wish to restrict the executive.

They may succeed

in that, but they also may succeed in removing American military power
as an instant and. effective element in diplomacy around the world.
And that, in the long run, may or may not serve the cause of peace.
There is.no doubt that alarum bells have rung in every
1

chancellory in the world, alerting diplomats to a new fact of life
!

-- the unwillingness of the American people, and the inability of
the American executive, to match the national power potential of
the United States against tie military potential of other countries.
President Ford recently dedicated the most powerful naval
!
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vessel in tie world, a 750 million dollar nuclear carrier.

But

six resolute raw recruits in a rusty rowboat, at the disposition of
a purposeful executive, might weigh more heavily in the scales of
world diplomacy than 6,000 sailors on the .most powerful vessel
or. the high seas, commanded by an admiral who cannot command the
pilot to take a hard rudder right without getting the course approved
by 500 wrangling politicians in Congress.
The force in the world, so long slowly rising over
decades, and then dramatically multiplying in the last two generations,
now diminishes. What will be the result?
in the affairs of the world?

What will be the result

What will be the result, internally,

in the United States itself, where its millions of citizens often
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have been astonishingly unaware of how the possession and use of
national power influenced their"lives and fortunes?
The immediate result, internally, may be one of relief.
The people are well aware of the disadvantages of great power.
They are as yet, not much aware of the disadvantages of great
weakness.

Probably they are pleased that the country, its power

diminishing and declining, no longer can pursue some policies they
found offensive and revolting, in pursuit of its foreign aims.
They may take some satisfaction that men in charge of national
affairs cannot do harm in remote places in the world.

Perhaps it

will only slowly dawn upon them that they also have divested their
government of the power to do good.
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As the power of the United States, both absolutely and
relatively, continues to diminish, some of the disadvantage of
diminishing power may become more apparent.

There seems to be little

popular fear of these disadvantages now.
Time may dull the irritations felt at the exercise of
power; and sharpen a sense of the irritations aroused by the
decline of power.

Ultimately, Americans may come to weigh the

years of American power in a fashion that will cause then to believe
.

that, in spite of t
errors and aberrations, the influence of the
United States on the course of world events was essentially beneficent
and benign.

The country, they may come to see, used its great power

with moderation, and come success.

This is not presently a widely

articulated view of how the nation employed great power.
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How successfully will it employ the lack of power?
That is the present anti future problem.

And how will the lack of

power -change the character, the attitudes, and the standards of a
people, now as unprepared for weakness as they were unprepared for
power at the start of World War I? It would be easy to err in making
any estimate of how this situation will change the United States;
but the greatest error would be the assumption that there will he
no change at all.
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